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This paper provides a general equilibrium framework in which the number of working
hours and the employment levels of heterogeneous workers is endogenously
determined. This is done in an environment where production requires coordinating
the work schedules of different worker types, a characteristic I refer to as team
production. In particular, I assume that all workers on a production team must work
the same hours. Output is produced by a large number of teams, where different
teams may operate different numbers of hours. The model economy has two types of
people, who differ in their preferences over leisure and in the labor services they
provide. Firms offer tied wage-hours packages to workers, who choose among these
packages. An interesting aspect of this economy is that wages are not linear in the
number of working hours, although prices are linear over the traded commodities. I
show that an employment tax on high-wage workers has substantially different effects
on the employment and wages of low-wage and high-wage workers when team
production is explicitly modeled compared to a case when it is not.1
1.  Introduction
In evaluating the consequences of many labor market policies and regulations, it
is crucial to understand the effect of these policies on firms' decisions about  working
hours and employment. In particular, policymakers would like to know whether and by
how much firms respond to various policies by adjusting employment levels and/or by
changing hours per worker, how these adjustments vary across workers with different
skills, and how these policies influence wage levels and wage disparities among workers.
 Examples of policies that may affect the hours and employment decisions of firms
include employment subsidies and taxes.
Existing general equilibrium models are poorly suited to evaluate such
consequences of labor market policies.  Virtually all of these models use a neoclassical
production function in which the labor input is simply total hours of each type of labor,
and thus makes no distinction between employment and hours per worker in production.
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium framework for evaluating labor
market policies which affect firms' decisions about work schedules and employment.  A
key feature of this framework is that the labor services of workers are coordinated in a
specific manner, a characteristic I call team production.  Since labor market policies
typically affect groups of workers differently, modeling the interaction of heterogeneous
workers in production may be important in analyzing the consequences of these policies.
In fact, labor economists have long recognized that team production plays a key
role in firms' decisions about work schedules and employment.  In the Handbook of
Labor Economics (Ashenfelter and Layard, 1986), Sherwin Rosen notes the potential
importance of team production, and characterizes it as follows:
Team production necessarily requires that hours decisions are closely
coordinated among all members, and this cannot be done if each member2
makes a unilateral decision of how many hours to work and how to
distribute them across the working day.
8
The goal of this paper is to develop a tractable general equilibrium framework
with team production in which the work schedules, employment, and wages of
heterogeneous workers are endogenously determined.  After presenting the framework, I
illustrate the potential importance of explicitly modeling team production in examining
the consequences of labor market policies using a simple example.
Team production is modeled in the following manner.  Output is produced by a
large number of production teams, each consisting of a group of heterogeneous
workers working with a given amount of capital for a fixed number of hours.  For
simplicity, I assume that hours worked by team members are "perfectly coordinated" in
the sense that all members of that team must work the same hours.  Different teams can
operate different numbers of hours.  The team production function distinguishes
between the stock of workers and machines and the number of hours each stock is
used.  The model economy focuses on firm-level decisions as to how long to operate its
teams, and how many workers of each type to employ.
A crucial aspect of this framework is that working hours are indivisible goods. 
Labor market commodities are differentiated by the type of labor and the number of
working hours.  Firms offer tied wage-hours packages to workers.  Workers decide 
which production team to work on by choosing among the packages offered, and then
must work the hours which that team operates.  People can work on one team at most,
and can randomize over different packages.  An interesting feature of this framework is
that wages are generally not linear in the number of working hours, but prices are
linear over the commodities traded.  This is a result of the commodity space used.
This framework is consistent with a striking feature of work schedules in the
                                      
     
8 This use of "team" differs from the meaning developed in Marshak (1954) and
Marshak and Radner (1972).3
U.S. economy that is ignored in standard labor supply theory and in most of the
applied general equilibrium literature:  Most workers are not free to unilaterally
determine their working hours at a given wage rate, but rather they must work the
hours set by their factory or office.
9  I conjecture that capturing this feature of reality is
important for understanding the determination of work schedules and employment. 
As a preliminary step in exploring the potential importance of modeling team
production explicitly when analyzing labor market policies, I present an illustrative
policy experiment.  In this example, I examine the consequences of an employment tax
on high-wage workers in two model economies that are identical except for the
specification of the technologies.  The first economy uses individual production, or
teams with one worker, and workers produce independently.  The second economy
uses team production in which high- and low-wage workers must work together.  I find
that modeling team production leads to significantly different predictions for the
consequences of this simple policy.
The model constructed here builds on the work of Hornstein and Prescott
(1993), who developed a general equilibrium construct in which work schedules are
endogenously determined.  In their construct, production is done by homogeneous
workers.  An extension of the Hornstein and Prescott setup that includes heterogeneous
workers is used as a reference point in illustrating the potential importance of team
production in analyzing labor market policies.
In focusing on the role of technology in determining work schedules and
defining the labor market commodities to be tied wage-hours packages, I am building
on the seminal work of Lewis (1969).  Several prominent papers by Rosen (1974,
1977, 1986) further develop these ideas and provide a framework for analyzing market
                                      
     
9 This observation has received considerable attention in recent years in the labor
supply literature.  See, for example, Altonji and Paxson (1988,1990), Kahn and Lang
(1991), and Dickens and Lundberg (1993).  In the applied general equilibrium
literature, Rogerson (1988) introduced indivisible labor in which people can only
choose to work an exogenously given number of hours. 4
equilibria where tied wage-hours packages are traded.  Kinoshita (1987) uses the
hedonic framework developed in Rosen (1974) to study the structure of working hours
and wages in a framework where working hours are indivisible goods.  However, none
of these papers provides a general equilibrium framework. 
In focusing on team production, I am following the work of Deardorff and
Stafford (1976), who explore the consequences of a coordination requirement on the
work schedules and wages of heterogeneous workers in a partial equilibrium
framework.  More recently, Weiss (1996) presents a model in which the work
schedules of workers with disparate preferences for leisure may be synchronized when
there are gains to working together.
The present paper is intended as a first step in developing general equilibrium
models useful for addressing the issues outlined above.  I have therefore tried to
develop a tractable framework that captures team production in a simple manner.  In
addressing a specific question one would generally want to modify this structure along
dimensions important for that question.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the
team production economy.  Section 3 provides the definition of a competitive
equilibrium and two properties of an equilibrium. Section 4 examines how preferences
and technology interact in this framework to determine work schedules and wages. 
Section 5 presents an illustrative policy experiment demonstrating the potential
importance of team production in policy analysis.  Section 6 contains some concluding
remarks.
2.  The Team Production Economy
The team production economy has one period and is populated by a continuum
of people with measure 1.  There are two types of people with measure l1 and l2
respectively, where l1 + l2 = 1.  Each person has a time endowment of 1 each period5
that can be allocated to either work, h, or leisure, l=1-h.  Type 1 and type 2 people
are endowed with k1 and k2 units of capital respectively.  People types are distinguished
by the following properties.  First, type 1 and type 2 labor services are different
factors of production.  Second, types may have different preferences over leisure.
A useful starting point when laying out the model economy is to describe the
team production technology and show that this technology gives rise to an aggregate
production possibility set which is a convex cone, a standard feature of general
equilibrium analysis.  In deriving the production possibility set, it is first necessary to
define an aggregate team production function and describe the commodity space used.
A.  Team Production Function 
 There are two types of workers in the economy, type 1 and type 2.  A
production team is a group of d1 type 1 workers and d2 type 2 workers, working h
hours with k units of capital.  Thus, a production team type can be characterized by a
four-tuple (h,k,d1,d2).  The output of a type (h,k,d1,d2) production team is given by the
team production function
(1) f(h,k,d1,d2) = h  k
qk d1
q1 d2




q2  if d1  >  N,
where qk+q1+q2 > 1, qk+q2 < 1, and qk,q1,q2 > 0.  Restricting the number of type
1 workers that are productive on a team is a convenient way of assuring that there will
be an optimal team type or types in equilibrium.6
The output of a team is proportional to how long the team operates.
10  Given the
assumption on the productivity of type 1 workers, there are decreasing returns to
additional workers and machines above some level, which is assumed to be small
relative to the size of the economy.   I refer to teams operating h hours as having a
workweek of length h.  Notice that the utilization of the capital stock varies with how
long a team operates.  I assume that each unit of capital can be used by only one team
of workers.
Each worker on a team must work the hours that the team operates.  Different
teams may operate different number of hours.  The formation of teams is costless to
firms. Parameters are chosen so that teams are small relative to the size of the
economy.  Although the team technology may appear to introduce a nonconvexity in
the aggregate production possibility set, we will see that, as in standard neoclassical
models, this set is a convex cone.   However, unlike typical neoclassical models, it
cannot be characterized by a neoclassical aggregate production function with capital
and aggregate hours of each of the labor types as inputs.
B.  Aggregate Team Production Function 
Next, I derive an aggregate team production function for teams operating h
hours.  This function gives the maximum output given K units of capital, D1 type 1
workers, and D2 type 2 workers if all teams must operate h hours.  The specification of
the team production function implies that, for a given h, output will be maximized by
having only one team type operating, with that team type having d1 equal to N.   Thus,
output is maximized by having a measure M equal to D1/N of team production types
(h,K/M,N,D2/M) operating.   A little algebra produces the aggregate team production
                                      
     
10 The technology could be written more generally to include features such as a
fixed set-up time for operating and the possibility of decreasing returns in the number
of hours a team is operated.  One example drawn from the labor demand literature has
y =  (h-s)
e f(k,d1,d2)  for h‡s‡0, where s is the set-up time per worker and 0<e£1.7
function for teams operating h hours:
(2) F(h,K,D1,D2) = A h K
qk D
-qk-q2 D2,
where A = N
-(1-qk-q1-q2).
It will be convenient to define an aggregate production team as a group of D1
type 1 workers and D2 type 2 workers, each working h hours, and K total units of
capital, with workers and capital assigned to production teams so that total output is
maximized, as given by (2).  As with a production team, an aggregate production team
type can be characterized by a four-tuple (h,K,D1,D2).
C.  Traded Commodities 
Before defining the aggregate production possibility set, we must specify the
commodities that are traded and priced in this economy.  The key feature of the
commodity space is that workweeks of different lengths and types are different
commodities.  Thus, there is a continuum of different labor inputs of each type.
11 
Introducing workweeks of different lengths as different commodities creates an
indivisibility.  People cannot work 2/3 of a 40-hour workweek and 1/3 of a 30-hour
workweek.  An analytically useful strategy for working with economies that have
indivisibilities is to allow people to randomize over workweeks of different lengths
using lotteries (following Prescott and Townsend [1984] and Rogerson [1988]).  With
the introduction of lotteries, people can work a 40-hour workweek with probability 2/3
and a 30-hour workweek with probability 1/3.
The set of feasible workweek lengths is denoted by H, where H￿[0,1].  The
exposition of the model economy is simplified by assuming that there is a large but
                                      
     
11 Rosen (1974) works with an economy that has a continuum of differentiated
products.  Mas-Colell (1975) introduced this feature into general equilibrium theory.8
finite number of possible workweek lengths.  For this case, H ” {h1,h2,..., hNh}, with 
h1=0, and hNh=1.  Type 1 people have access to lotteries over type 1 labor workweeks
of lengths h˛H, and type 2 people have access to lotteries over type 2 labor
workweeks.  People can only supply workweeks of their own type, and may work on
only one team.  A person cannot work a 20-hour workweek with one team and a 30-
hour workweek with a second team, but can choose to work on a team working 50
hours.
The commodity space, denoted by L, is R
2 x M(H) x M(H), where M(H)
denotes the set of signed measures on the Borel sigma algebra of H.  An element of L
is given by (c,k,n1,n2), where c is the consumption good, k is the services of the capital
stock, n1 is a measure over type 1 labor workweeks, and n2 is a measure over type 2
labor workweeks.  One unit of capital produces one unit of capital services.  When H
is a finite set, n1 is a vector and n1(h) is the measure of type 1 workweeks of length h. 
Similarly, n2 is a vector and n2(h) is the measure of type 2 workweeks of length h.
D.  Aggregate Production Possibility Set 
Before defining the aggregate production possibility set, I first define an
aggregate production plan.  Let J denote the set of feasible aggregate production team
types, so that J￿R.  Again for expositional clarity assume that J is a finite set, so that
we can index possible aggregate team types by j = {1,2,...,NJ}, where NJ is the
number of possible aggregate team types.  Next, let mj denote the measure of aggregate
teams of type j operated, where mj‡0.  An aggregate production plan is a vector of NJ
numbers, {m1,m2,...,mNJ}, that describes how the aggregate inputs are distributed
across teams of different types.  The aggregate production possibility set, Y, is defined
as follows.
Y ” { {C,K,N1,N2} :  there exists a production plan m˛RJ  such that9




Sj mj Kj £  K
S{j: hj=h} mj D1j £ N1(h)         all h ˛ H
S{j: hj=h} mj D2j £ N2(h)         all h ˛ H. }.
The first constraint says that the total amount of the consumption good is less than or
equal to the total output produced by all team types.  The second constraint states that
the capital allocated across all team types is less than or equal to the total capital
available.  The third and fourth constraints state that the amount of type 1 (type 2)
workweeks of length h allocated across all team types is less than or equal to the total
amount of type 1 (type 2) workweeks of length h available.  It is immediate that Y is a
convex cone.  As with models with neoclassical aggregate production functions, the
number of firms is indeterminate.  Thus, for convenience, we may act as if there is one
firm.
E.  Preferences
The specification of this economy is completed by presenting people's
preference ordering and their feasible consumption bundles.  The utility of a type i
person, i ˛ {1,2}, choosing the commodity point x=(c,k,n1,n2) is given by 
(3) Ui(x)  ”  u(c) - Sh ni(h) vi(h) ,
where vi: R+ ﬁ R+  and u: R+ ﬁ R, vi(0) = 0, and lim cﬁ0 u¢(c) = ¥.  Notice that Sh
ni(h) vi(h) is the expected disutility of working for type i.
The consumption possibility set of a type i person is given by
(4) Xi(ki) ” { (c,k,n1,n2) : k£ki, Sh˛H ni(h)=1, ni(h)‡0 and nj(h)=0 all h˛H, j„i   10
c‡0, k‡0 },
where ki is type i's capital stock endowment.  The consumption possibility set of a type
i person, Xi(ki), contains the following conditions: capital services are restricted by the
capital stock endowment; ni is a probability measure; type i people cannot work a type
j workweek for j„i; and the standard nonnegativity constraints apply.
3.  Competitive Equilibrium
Next, I describe the decision problems faced by the firm and by individuals in
this economy, provide the definition of a competitive equilibrium, and establish some
equilibrium properties.  The commodities traded are given by x = (c,k,n1,n2).  Prices
are in terms of the consumption good.  The rental price of capital is given by r.  Next,
w1 and w2 are pricing functions mapping signed measures into R+.  With a finite set of
possible workweeks, w1 is a vector of prices, where w1(h) is the price of a type 1
workweek of length h.  That is, if a type 1 person works a type 1 workweek of length
h with probability one, then that worker receives w1(h) units of the consumption good.
 Similarly, w2 is a vector of prices for type 2 workweeks.  
A.  The Firm's Decision Problem
The firm in this economy rents capital, employs type 1 and type 2 workers to
work weeks of various lengths, and decides how to allocate these resources across
teams of different types.  In hiring type 1 workers, the firm buys lottery contracts from
type 1 people.  These lottery contracts specify the probability of working type 1
workweeks of different lengths, possibly including a workweek of length 0. The firm
then uses a randomizing technology to determine which workweek each type 1 person
will work.  However, the firm, which sells a large number of contracts, faces no11
uncertainty as to the number of type 1 workers who will work different workweek
lengths.  The hiring of type 2 workers occurs in the same fashion.  One interpretation
of this contract is that the firm is providing full insurance to workers against the
uncertainty of the length of their weekly hours.
Given prices (r,w1,w2), the firm solves the following optimization problem:
(5) max  C  -  r K  -  Sh w1(h) N1(h)  -  Sh w2(h) N2(h)
subject to
(6) (C,K,N1,N2) ˛ Y,
where N1(h) and N2(h) are the total number (or, more precisely, measure) of type 1
and type 2 workweeks of length h.
B.  Individuals' Decision Problems
Individuals in this economy purchase the consumption good and sell capital and
labor services to firms.  In selling labor services, an individual sells a lottery contract
that specifies the probability of working different workweek lengths.  The amount an
individual receives for a given lottery contract does not depend on the lottery's
outcome, that is, on the length of the workweek the individual works ex post.
12
A type i person, i ˛ {1,2}, solves the problem
                                      
     
     12 Several decentralizations have been put forth.  Hansen (1985) shows that
equilibria with lotteries are equivalent to equilibria in which people are paid according
to the workweek actually worked as determined by the lottery, but where people have
access to actuarially fair insurance.  Shell and Wright (1993) reinterpret equilibria with
lotteries as Arrow-Debreu equilibria without lotteries when sunspots are introduced. 
Cole and Prescott (1994) employ an economy with gambles and deterministic
exchanges as a decentralization.  12
(7) max {  u(c)  -  Sh ni(h) vi(h)  }
subject to
(8) (c,k,n1,n2) ˛ Xi(ki) 
(9) c  £  r k + Sh wi(h) ni(h).
C.  Definition of Equilibrium




and a price system (r, w1, w2) such that
i) xi
* maximizes Ui(x) subject to x ˛ Xi(ki), and the budget constraint (9),
i˛{1,2}





 I restrict my attention to anonymous equilibrium allocations having the property that
all people of the same type choose the same commodity point.
13  This does not imply
that all people of the same type work the same workweek length, since the allocation
will generally involve randomizing over different workweek lengths.
When the set of feasible workweeks H is finite, the commodity space is finite
dimensional and it is straightforward to show that the first and second welfare theorems
hold, and that there exists an equilibrium.
14  Therefore, we can study the properties of
the anonymous Pareto optima of this economy to establish properties of competitive
equilibrium allocations.
                                      
     
     13 See Hornstein and Prescott (1993) or Cole and Prescott (1994) for a discussion
of this restriction.
     
     14 See Stokey and Lucas (1989).13
The set of anonymous Pareto optima is the closure of the set of solutions to the
weighted social planner's problems with positive weights.  The Y-weighted social
planner's problem, where 0 < Y < 1, is to maximize
(10) Y l1 U1(x1)  +  (1-Y) l2 U2(x2)
subject to x1 ˛ X1(K),  x2 ˛ X2(K), y ˛ Y, and l1x1 + l2x2 = y.  A solution to this
problem exists, given that the Ui functions are continuous and the constraint set is
compact.
15
The characteristics of Pareto optimal allocations can be derived by analyzing a
much simpler equivalent problem.  For this problem, we no longer distinguish between
the organization of production (m) and the supply of work schedules (ni).  Let the event
j now be characterized by a triplet (h,k,d), where an event is interpreted as an
aggregate team working h hours with k units of capital per type 1 worker and d type 2
workers per type 1 worker.  Assume there is a finite number of possible (h,k,d) triplets
indexed by j.  The set of Pareto optimal allocations comprises the solutions to the
following  problem:
(11) maxc1,c2,m‡0   Y l1  {u(c1)  - Sj mj v1(hj)}   +   (1-Y) l2 {u(c2)  - Sj mj dj v2(hj)}
(12)  l1c1 + l2c2  £  Sj mj A hj kj
qk dj
q2
(13) Sj mj kj £  K
(14) Sj mj  = l1
(15) Sj mj dj = l2.
                                      
     
     15 The consumption possibility set can be made compact by specifying an upper
bound on consumption that is greater than the maximum possible output.15
equilibrium allocation solves the Pareto problem for some weight Y.  For each Y there
is a unique allocation x1(Y), x2(Y) that solves the Pareto problem and a unique initial
capital allocation k1(Y), k2(Y) that corresponds to a competitive equilibrium without
transfers.  Given total capital K ”  l1k1 + l2k2, it can be shown that k1(Y) is a strictly
increasing function of Y.  This implies that there is at most one weight Y for which (k1
,k2) is a competitive equilibrium without transfers, and the unique solution to this
Pareto problem is the unique equilibrium allocation. o
When the set of feasible workweeks H is no longer a finite set but instead is the
interval from 0 to 1, and the set of feasible aggregate plant types J is a rectangular
subset of R, then the summations in the various optimization problems are replaced by
integrals over measures.  In this case, the commodity space is infinite dimensional and
the Second Welfare Theorem is much more difficult to prove.  However, this theorem
has been proved for economies with similar constructs to that of the economy presented
here, and I conjecture that propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold for this limiting
economy.
17  For the remainder of this paper, I assume that there is a continuum of
feasible workweek lengths, H”[0,1], and the set of feasible aggregate production team
types, J, is a rectangle in R
4.
4.  Determination of Work Schedules
In this section, I examine more closely how the team technology and
individuals' preferences interact to determine work schedules, wages, and employment
in this environment.  It is useful to begin by looking at the firm's problem in more
detail.  Necessary conditions for a solution to the firm's optimization problem are
                                      
     
     17 See Cole and Prescott (1994) and Rios-Rull and Prescott (1991) for a full
discussion of equilibrium existence and welfare theorems in similar economies.16
(16) A hj Kj
qk D1j
1-qk-q2 D2j
q2 - rKj - w1(hj) D1j - w2(hj) D2j      £  0  
for all team types j˛J,
=  0    for all types j with mj > 0.
These conditions state that no aggregate team type earns strictly positive profits in
equilibrium, and the aggregate team types that are operated generate zero profit.  Since
the left-hand side of (16) is homogeneous of degree zero in (K,D1,D2), only the ratios
K/D1 and D2/D1 are determined for aggregate production team types with zero profit in
equilibrium.
18
Next, define the profit function
(17) p p(h,K,D2;p)  =  A h K
qk D2
q2  -  r K  -  w1(h)  -  w2(h) D2,











*}  ˛  argmax p p(h,K,D2;p)   s.t  h£1 and nonnegativity.
A marginal condition for an equilibrium workweek length, assuming an interior
solution, is given by setting the derivative of the profit function p p(h,K,D2;p) with
respect to h equal to zero, which is written
(19)   A K
qkD2
q2   =   w(h)  +  w(h) D2,
                                      
     
     18 Recall that for a given h and output level there is a unique production team
type that is operated in equilibrium.17
where w(h) and w(h) denote the derivatives of w1(h) and w2(h) with respect to h. 
Equation (19) states that, at an interior equilibrium workweek h, the additional output
from increasing h must equal the increase in wage payments.  It is clear that the shape
of the wage functions is critical in determining the workweek lengths operated in
equilibrium.
Notice that conditional on h, p p(h,￿,￿ ;p) is a strictly concave function in K and
D2.  The solution to the problem of maximizing p p(h,K,D2;p) by choice of K and D2 is
uniquely solved by
(20) K









where Bk and Bd are positive constants that depend on q2 and qk, and q1 = 1-qk-q2. 
Substituting (20) and (21) into (17), we can define the implicit profit function by
(22) P(h;p)  ”  p p[h,K
*(h;p),D2
*(h;p);p]  =  B r
-qk/q1 h
1/q1 w2(h)
-q2/q1  -  w1(h),
where B is a positive constant that depends on q2 and qk.  This function returns the
profit the firm can earn at each workweek length if it chooses to employ one type 1
worker.  The problem of the firm then boils down to finding an h that maximizes
P(h;p), given prices.
The next step is to characterize the shape of the equilibrium wage schedules. 
Not surprisingly, individuals' preferences over workweeks determine the shape of the
wage schedules.  Necessary conditions for a solution to individuals' maximization
problems are
(23) wivi (h)  + ui ‡  wi (h)  for all h ˛ H,18
   =   wi(h)  if ni(h) > 0, and
(24) ui ni(0)  =  0,
where wi is the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption, and ui is the multiplier
on the constraint that an individual cannot place more than one unit of probability
across workweek lengths.  The multiplier ui is nonnegative and equals zero if type i
people place positive weight on working a workweek of length 0.  That is, ui is zero if
type i people are not all working in equilibrium.  The conditions in (23) hold with
equality if a lottery contract is traded that has a strictly positive probability of working
a type i workweek of length h.
An interesting feature of this framework is that some workweek lengths are not
traded in equilibrium.  The equilibrium prices for these workweek lengths are typically
not uniquely determined.  However, since wi and ui are determined in equilibrium, the
left-hand side of the equations in (23) provide an upper bound for these equilibrium
prices.  For a given workweek length, this upper bound gives the wage at which people
are just indifferent to supplying, or not supplying, that workweek length.  These upper
bounds can be interpreted as the supply reservation wages of workweeks of different
lengths, which are defined as
(25) w(h;w1
*,u1
*)  = w1




*)  = w2
*v2(h)  + u2





* are equilibrium values.
19  A useful procedure for selecting
                                      
     
     19 These supply reservation wages correspond to what Lewis (1969) refers to as
"employee equalizing wage curves," and what Rosen (1986) terms "worker
indifference curves."  One can also define demand reservation wages that correspond
to "labor demand" curves, and then derive the equilibrium tangency conditions that are
central to the definitions of equilibrium used in these papers.  The advantage of the
current setup is that the prices are linear over the commodities traded and the tools of
general equilibrium theory can be applied.19
equilibrium prices for workweeks not traded in equilibrium is to set these prices using
the equations in (25).
Supply reservation wages are the wages the firm must pay to attract workers at
various workweek lengths.   These wage functions can be substituted into the profit
functions (17) and (22) to gain insight into the equilibrium work schedules and
employment rates that arise in this model under different assumptions for preferences
over leisure.  This is now done for a particular example.
A.  An Example  
In this subsection I present an example and determine the nature of the
equilibrium work schedules and employment for different parameter choices.  First, let
preferences over workweek lengths be given by
(26) v1(h)  =  g1 h
a1,
v2(h)  =  g2 h
a2, 
where  g1>0, g2.>0, a1‡1, and a2‡1.  The disutility of a workweek of length h for
each type is an increasing, convex function of h.  The parameters a1 and a2 can be
interpreted as risk aversion parameters that determine how averse people are to
randomizing over workweeks of different lengths.  Loosely speaking, the larger the
value of a the greater is the loss in utility from randomizing.
Next, I characterize the equilibrium workweek lengths and employment rates
for various assumptions on the preference parameters.  Since we are ultimately
interested in equilibria with less than full employment, for the sake of simplicity I
restrict my attention to the subset of the parameter space, call it Q, for which there
exists an equilibrium in which there is a strictly positive measure of type 2 people not
employed (that is, n2(0)>0).  The propositions given in this subsection apply for the22
of the profit function with respect to h is strictly negative for all positive h.  This
implies strictly negative profits for all strictly positive workweek lengths, and hence no
production.  But there must be positive production in equilibrium, given the assumption
on the preferences over consumption.  o
This proposition says that if people are sufficiently averse to randomizing over
workweek lengths, then no randomization occurs for that type in equilibrium.
To illustrate the possible shapes of the equilibrium profit function P(￿ ;p), I
compute the equilibria of two model economies.  The first economy has both a1  and
a2 set to 1, so that proposition 4 applies.   The second economy is identical except that
a1 is set to 2, so that proposition 5 applies (in both economies 1/q1=2).  The parameter
values of these economies are given in table 1, along with the equilibrium employment
rates and workweek length for each economy.  Figure 1 shows the equilibrium implicit
profit functions for the two economies when equilibrium wage rates are set to the
supply reservation wages defined in (30).  
The example in this subsection illustrates that the crucial elements determining
equilibrium workweek length(s) in this framework are the tensions between risk-averse
people who may have different preferences over work and a technology in which
heterogeneous workers must work in teams and in which the distinction between hours
per worker and number of workers is important for productivity.  While this
specification of preferences is useful as an example, the following proposition shows
why it is less useful for applied work.
PROPOSITION 6.  Either n1(0) = 0 or h = 1 in equilibrium.
Proof.  The proof is by contradiction.  Suppose that n1(0)>0 and h<1 in equilibrium.
 Proposition 3, the continuity of the profit function P(￿;p), and the zero profit
equilibrium condition imply that only at the equilibrium h does P¢(h;p) equal zero. 23
This implies that P(0;p) is less than zero, which in turn implies that n1 > 0, or
equivalently, that n1(0) = 0, a contradiction.  o
Recall that in this section I am only considering economies in which some type 2
people are not employed.  This proposition states that for such economies either all
type 1 workers are employed or the equilibrium workweek length is one.  Since
ultimately we are likely to be interested in economies with less than full employment of
both types and with workweek lengths less than one in equilibrium, I consider a
different specification of preferences in the next section.
5.  A Simple Policy Experiment
As a preliminary step in exploring the potential importance of team production
in analyzing labor market policies, I present an illustrative policy experiment that
addresses a basic question:  Can modeling team production explicitly have important
implications for analyzing labor market policies and regulations in which firm-level
decisions about the work schedules and employment of heterogeneous workers play a
crucial role?
To investigate this question I examine the consequences of an employment tax
on high-wage workers in two model economies that are identical except for the
specification of the technologies.  The first economy uses individual production (teams
with one worker).  Workers with different wages produce independently.  The second
economy uses team production in which workers with different wages must work
together.
The experiment is organized as follows:  I first select parameter values so that
the equilibrium of each economy reproduces a common set of observations that are
roughly drawn from U.S. data.  I then compare the implications of imposing a per
person tax on the employment of high-wage workers for the work schedules, wages,24
and employment of both high-wage and low-wage workers in the two economies.
  The functional forms for preferences used in both economies are
(28) u1(c) =  u2(c) = log(c), and
(29) vi(h) =  - gi [ (1-h)
s - 1 ] / s for si „ 0
=  - gi log(1-h) for si = 0 i˛{1,2},
where gi ‡ 0  for i˛{1,2} and s<1.  Preferences for type 1 and type 2 people differ
only in the parameters g1 and g2.  This specification of vi(h) guarantees interior
solutions for equilibrium workweek lengths, since v(h) ﬁ ¥ as h ﬁ 1.
In both economies the firm solves the following optimization problem:
(30) max  C  -  r K  -  Sh {w1(h)+c1} N1(h)  -  Sh w2(h) N2(h)
subject to
(31) (C,K,N1,N2) ˛ Y,
where c1 is the employment tax on type 1 workers, who are parameterized to be the
high-wage workers in equilibrium.  Tax revenues are thrown into the ocean.  The
difference between the two economies is the specification of the production set Y.  For
the team production economy this set was defined in section 2.  For the individual
production economy this set will be defined below.
A.  Team Production Economy 
The team production economy is the economy described in sections 2 and 3,
except that there is a continuum of workweek lengths between 0 and 1 and the set J of
feasible aggregate production team types is a rectangle in R
4.  For the parameter values
used in this experiment, the equilibrium of the team production economy has all teams25
operating the same workweek length.  This is true even when employment tax rates are
different for the two types.
B.  Individual Production Economy 
The individual production economy is similar to the economy presented in
Hornstein and Prescott (1993), but extended to include heterogeneous workers. 
Production in this economy is done by individuals (teams with one worker), working
independently.  A type i person working h hours with k units of capital produces




  When there is a finite number of possible hours-capital pairs given by the set
J, where J￿R, the aggregate production possibility set is derived in the manner
described in section 2.  Let m denote the measure of type i individuals, i˛{1,2},
working hj hours with kj units of capital, j˛J.  An aggregate production plan is a pair
of measures, m
1 and m
2.  The aggregate production possibility set for the individual
production economy is given by
Y  ” { {C,K,N1,N2} :  there exists a production plan m
1, m
2 such that
C  £  Sj m A1 hj kj
qk  +  Sj m A2 hj kj
qk
Sj (m+m) kj £  K
S{j: hj=h} m  £ N1(h) all h ˛ H
                                      
     
     21  This economy is equivalent to the team production economy where type 1 and
type 2 workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes, that is, where output is  y =  h
K
qk [ (A1D1)
r +  (A2D2)
r ]
(1-qk)/r, and r = 1.26
S{j: hj=h} m  £ N2(h) all h ˛ H }.
For the individual production economy used in this section, there is a continuum of
feasible workweek lengths; the set of feasible hours-capital pairs J is a rectangular
subset of R.
All other aspects of the individual production economy are the same as in the
team production economy.  A key property of an equilibrium of the individual
production economy is given in the following proposition.  
PROPOSITION 7.  An equilibrium of the individual production economy has type 1
people placing mass only on workweek lengths 0 and h1, and type 2 people placing
mass only on workweek lengths 0 and h2.
Proof.  The proof of this proposition is a simple extension of the proof provided in
Hornstein and Prescott (1993).  o
The next step is to choose parameter values for both economies.
C.  Parameter Selection
The parameter values are selected so that the equilibria of the two model
economies without taxes are identical.  Each economy has nine parameters, chosen so
that type 1 people have higher wages and a higher employment rate than type 2 people.
 The percentage of the population that is type 1 is set to 20 percent.  The capital
endowments are chosen so that the ratio of the endowments is equal to the ratio of the
equilibrium labor incomes, and are normalized so that total capital is 1.  The
parameters g1 and g2 are chosen so that the employment-population ratio of type 1
people is .9, and the total employment-population ratio is .75.  The parameter s is27
selected so that the hours per worker of both type 1 and type 2 workers is .40. 
Assuming there are 100 hours in a week that are not allocated to sleep and personal
care, this corresponds to a 40 hour workweek.  Finally, qk is chosen so that capital's
share of income is .36.
The remaining parameters are (A,q1) for the team production economy and
(A1,A2) for the individual production economy.  These parameters are selected so that
the hourly wage rate of type 1 workers is 2 times the hourly wage rate of type 2
workers, and so that total output is 1.  The parameter values for both economies are
given in table 2.28
D.  Results
This section reports the consequences of introducing a tax on the employment of
high-wage workers in an economy with individual production and in an economy with
team production.  In each model economy, this tax is chosen to be 1 percent of the
equilibrium weekly wage rate of the type 1 workers in that economy without taxes. 
Table 3 reports how the equilibrium employment, hours, and wages are affected by the
employment tax in the two economies.
The first column in table 3 provides equilibrium prices and quantities in the two
economies without taxes.  Recall that the parameters were chosen so that these
equilibria are the same.  The second and third columns report the percent change in the
equilibrium prices and quantities in the individual and team production economies,
respectively, when the employment tax is imposed.
For the individual production economy the tax on type 1 workers has,
qualitatively, the expected effect on employment and hours of type 1 workers.  That is,
the firm hires fewer type 1 workers to work longer hours.  The 1 percent tax on type 1
workers results in a decline in their employment rate of 3 percent.  Perhaps
surprisingly, the hourly wage rate is unchanged.  The depressing effect of the tax on
type 1 wage rates is offset by the fact that type 1 workers are now relatively more
scarce and are working longer hours, both of which suggest higher hourly wage rates. 
The tax has very little effect on the  employment, hours, and wages of type 2 workers.
The consequences of the employment tax on type 1 workers in the team
production economy are quite different.  While the qualitative effect on employment
and hours of type 1 workers is the same, the employment rate of type 1 people falls by
only 1.4 percent, while the workweek increases by less than half the increase in the
individual production economy.  The hourly wage rate of type 1 workers now falls by
0.4 percent.  Type 2 people are no longer unaffected by the employment tax on type 1
workers when there is team production.  The firm hires 1.0 percent fewer type 2
workers to work the longer workweek.  However, the hourly wage rate of the type 229
workers increases by 0.3 percent.
To summarize, the effect of a 1 percent employment tax on type 1 workers is
quite different in the model with team production, relative to the model where workers
produce independently.  In the individual production economy, the decline in
employment falls exclusively on type 1 workers, and hourly wage rates are essentially
unchanged.  In the model with team production, however, the decline in employment is
felt by both types, while the hourly wage rate disparity between the two types narrows
by 0.7 percent.  The hourly wage rate of type 2 workers actually increases in the
model with team production.
6.  Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper has been to incorporate team production into a
tractable general equilibrium framework.  The structure of equilibrium work schedules,
wages, and employment was explored for a specific example, and an illustrative policy
experiment suggested that modeling team production can be important when analyzing
labor market policies that affect firm-level decisions about the work schedules and
employment of heterogeneous workers.
A potential advantage of this framework for the quantitative analysis of labor
market policies is that the technology is specified closer to the establishment level than
in models that use an aggregate production function.  Modeling the interaction between
hours and employment at the establishment level may be crucial when analyzing certain
policies.  Furthermore, an abundance of data collected at the establishment level and
microeconomic studies that use this data are available to guide the specification of the
functional forms and to assign parameter values.
As I noted in the introduction, the model presented here captures team
production in a simple and stark manner.  Furthermore, potentially important
considerations such as various fixed costs of employment, for example commuting time30
and set-up costs, have been abstracted from.  Addressing specific policy questions will
generally require extending this framework along such dimensions, which is a task for
future work.31
References
Altonji, Joseph G. and Paxson, Christina H.  "Labor Supply Preferences, Hours
Constraints, and Hours-Wage Trade-offs."  Journal of Labor Economics 6 (1988): 254-
76.
-------- and --------.  "Labor Supply, Hours Constraints and Job Mobility." NBER 
Working Paper Series No. 3473 (October 1990).
Cole, Harold L., and Prescott, Edward C.  "Valuation Equilibria with Clubs."  Staff
Report 174, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1994).
Deardorff, Alan V. and Stafford, Frank P.  "Compensation of Cooperating Factors." 
Econometrica 44 (July 1976):  671-84.
Dickens, William T. and Lundberg, Shelly J.  "Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply."
International Economic Review 34 (February 1993): 169-92.
Hornstein, Andreas and Prescott, Edward C.  "The Firm and the Plant in General
Equilibrium Theory."  In General Equilibrium and Growth: The Legacy of
Lionel McKenzie, edited by Robert Becker, Michele Boldrin, Ronald Jones, and
William Thomson.  Academic Press, 1993, pp. 393-410.
Kahn, Shulamit and Lang, Kevin.  "The Effect of Hours Constraints on Labor Supply 
Estimates." The Review of Economics and Statistics  93 (1991) 605-11.
Kinoshita, Tomio.  "Working Hours and Hedonic Wages in the Market Equilibrium." 
Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987): 1262-77.
Lewis, H. Gregg.  "Employer Interests in Employee Hours of Work."  Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Chicago, 1969.
Marshak, Jacob.  "Elements for a Theory of Teams."  Management Science 1 (October
1955): 127-37.
Marshak, Jacob and Radner, Roy.  Economic Theory of Teams.  Cowles Foundation
for Research in Economics at Yale University, Monograph 22, Yale University Press,
1972.32
Mas-Colell, Andreu.  "A Model of Equilibrium with Differentiated Commodities." 
Journal of Mathematical Economics 2 (1975): 263-95.
Prescott, Edward C. and Townsend, Robert M.  "General Competitive Analysis in an
Economy with Private Information."  International Economic Review 25 (February
1984):  1-20.
Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, and Prescott, Edward C.  "Classical Competitive Analysis of
Economies with Islands." 
Rogerson, Richard.  "Indivisible Labor, Lotteries, and Equilibrium."  Journal of
Monetary Economics, 21 (1988):  3-16.
Rosen, Sherwin.  "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in
Pure Competition."  Journal of Political Economy 82 (1974): 34-55.
--------.  "The Supply of Work Schedules and Employment."  In Work Time and 
Employment, edited by R. Clark.  U.S. Government Printing Office, (1977)
pp.  145-73.
--------.  "The Theory of Equalizing Differences."  Chapter 12 in Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Volume I, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard.  
Elsevier Science Publishers BV, 1986, pp. 641-92.
Shell, Karl and Wright, Randall.  "Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Sunspot Equilibria."  
Economic Theory 3 (1993):  1-17.
Stokey, Nancy L. and Lucas, Robert E. Jr.  Recursive Methods in Economic 
Dynamics.  Harvard University Press, 1989.
Weiss, Yoram. "Synchronization of Work Schedules." International Economic Review
37 (February 1996): 157-79..33
TABLE 1
PARAMETER VALUES FOR EXAMPLES
Economy 1:  a1 = 1
Economy 2:  a1 = 2
Both Economies
a2=   1.000
l1=   0.500
k1=   1.000
k2=   1.000
g1=   2.308
g2=   1.852
qk=   0.350
q2=   0.150
A=   1.000
EQUILIBRIUM WORKWEEKS  AND EMPLOYMENT
Economy 1: a1=1 Economy 2: a1=2
Workweek (h) 1.0 0.583
Employment Rates
Type 1 (n1) 0.4 1.000
Type 2 (n2) 0.2 0.34334
TABLE 2
PARAMETER VALUES FOR TWO ECONOMIES
PARAMETER TEAM PRODUCTION INDIVIDUAL PROD.
PRODUCTION       ECONOMY       ECONOMY
l1  0.2000  0.2000
k1  1.9355  1.9355
k2  0.7661  0.7661
s -0.7273 -0.7273
g1  1.1495  1.1495
g2  1.4519  1.4519
qk  0.3600  0.3600
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- q1  0.2477  n.a.
22
A  4.7665  n.a.
A1  n.a.  4.0810
A2  n.a.  2.6189
                                      
     22 not applicable35
TABLE 3
EFFECT OF A 1 PERCENT EMPLOYMENT TAX ON TYPE 1 WORKERS
Effect of Employment Tax on Type 1 Workers
No Individual Prod.     Team Prod.
Tax
23       Economy       Economy
TAXES
c1 0.0 0.014 0.014
total tax revenue 0.0 0.003 0.003
% change % change
WORK SCHEDULES
workweek length
type 1 0.400  1.7%  0.7%
type 2 0.400  0.0  0.7
EMPLOYMENT
employment rates
type 1 0.900 -3.0 -1.4
type 2 0.713  0.1 -1.0
total 0.750 -0.7 -1.1
total hours per capita 0.300 -0.3 -0.5
WAGES per hour
type 1 3.441  0.0 -0.4
type 2 1.720  0.1  0.3
                                      
     23 Economies have same equilibrium without taxes.